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CHINA’S OIL SECURIT Y PIPE DREAM
The Reality, and Strategic Consequences, of Seaborne Imports
Andrew S. Erickson and Gabriel B. Collins

B

etween now and 2025—a widely used strategic planning horizon—the
world’s major economies will likely still depend to a large degree on traditional energy sources. Oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG), despite their economic and strategic differences, are the two with inherent naval significance, as
they must be transported by sea to the extent that domestic supplies or overland
pipelines are insufficient.1 Indeed, maritime transport is properly conceived
as a default, as it is almost always significantly cheaper than any overland alternatives, many of which are simply impractical in any case. The recent
global recession has further reduced tanker rates. Private-sector analysts have
produced detailed forecasts of supply and demand for these two critical commodities. But no researchers have yet produced a detailed study of the strategic
and naval implications of Chinese energy access.2 The market focus of energy
intelligence firms and the lack of security and technical information informing
journalists in the energy field have so far precluded analysis of the issue.
This gap must be fi lled. The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends
2025 report “projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers,
notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system” that “will
be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources”—one
of them being energy.3 Russia will have great influence as an energy supplier.
“No other countries are projected to rise to the level of China, India, or Russia,
and none is likely to match their individual global clout.”4 More specifically,
“Maritime security concerns are providing a rationale for naval buildups and
modernization efforts, such as China’s and India’s development of blue-water
naval capabilities.”5
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Useful insights into these potential trends can be gained by considering the
physical and economic realities of oil transshipment. This article assesses the
relative dependence of China (as a consumer) on seaborne oil flows between
now and 2025. China’s oil security concerns will help shape its military and
policy priorities fundamentally, with significant implications for the U.S. Navy
in coming years. For the present, it underscores a question of fundamental importance concerning China’s strategic orientation: To what extent will China
seek to transform itself from a continental to a continental-maritime power?6
Chinese oil demand, growing rapidly, has reached 8.5 million barrels* per
day (mbpd), even amid the global recession.7 China became a net oil importer
in 1993 and likely became a net gasoline importer by the end of 2009. While still
a very significant oil producer, China is now the world’s second-largest oil user.
It now imports half of its crude oil, with imports reaching a record 4.6 million
bpd in July 2009.8 Seaborne imports, which overland pipelines will not reduce,
constitute more than 80 percent of this total.9 At present, therefore, 40 percent
of China’s oil comes by sea.
Chinese security analysts and policy makers worry about their nation’s “excessive” reliance on seaborne oil shipments. Many believe that by investing in
pipelines to deliver oil from neighboring oil producers like Russia and Kazakhstan and building additional lines to “bypass” the Malacca Strait, China can
protect its oil imports from possible interdiction during a conflict.
A robust internal debate is being waged within China at multiple levels and
across a number of disciplines regarding how to ensure access to oil supplies.
At stake is the extent to which China should cooperate with international economic institutions versus seeking unilateral military solutions; 10 should develop as a maritime versus continental power; and should focus on defending
against state, as opposed to nonstate, actors.11 Despite this diversity of opinion,
a wide variety of influential Chinese experts, including scholars, policy analysts,
and members of the military, believe that the United States can sever China’s
seaborne energy supplies at will and in a crisis might well choose to do so.12 It
is widely claimed, for instance, that “whoever controls the Strait of Malacca effectively grips China’s strategic energy passage, and can threaten China’s energy
security at any time.”13
Such views are widely cited to justify pipeline construction, which is proceeding rapidly. China already has fifty thousand kilometers of oil and gas pipelines
and will nearly double the amount, to ninety thousand, during the Twelfth FiveYear Plan (2011–15).14
* There are 7.3 barrels of oil in a ton.
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Yet as this analysis will demonstrate, China’s overland oil supply plans may
largely be a “pipe dream,” driven by a combination of a misunderstanding of
global oil market mechanisms, incomplete assessment of security issues, and the
lobbying by sectoral and local commercial and political interests of a massively
overtaxed national energy policy-making apparatus. Some projects—such as
the line from Russia that is now under construction and an existing line from
Kazakhstan—are indeed economically viable overland projects that will bring
at least limited diversity to China’s oil supplies. Others, however, like the proposed lines through Burma and Pakistan, make much less economic and security sense.
In the end, pipelines are not likely to increase Chinese oil import security in
quantitative terms, because the additional volumes they bring in will be overwhelmed by China’s demand growth; the country’s net reliance on seaborne oil
imports will grow over time, pipelines notwithstanding. If we estimate Chinese
oil-import-demand growth conservatively at an average of 2.5 percent annually
over the next five years, Beijing’s imports will still increase by a total of around
650,000 barrels a day—more than the combined volume that the pipelines from
Russia and Kazakhstan will likely be able to bring in by 2013.15 Of that total,
the 300,000 bpd from Russia will not be “new” overland supplies but, rather,
consist primarily of a transfer from rail to pipe as the crude volumes previously
carried into China by train are moved into the pipeline instead. The proposed
Burma–China and Pakistan–China lines are simply “shortcut” routes, not true
overland supply alternatives; oil will still have to be carried by sea in tankers to
the pipelines’ starting points.
A total figure for these two sources, Russia and Kazakhstan, of around
500,000 bpd may seem low, but it reflects the reality that China’s neighbors have
limited capacity to offset its seaborne oil imports. Their reserves are limited in
key potential supply areas (e.g., eastern Siberia), and politics further complicate
the picture. Kazakhstan, for its part, is pursuing a three-vector oil export policy.
It entails shipping oil through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium line to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk; to China through the Atasu–Alashankou
line; and, soon, through the $1.5 billion Kazakhstan Caspian Pipeline System to
a port on the Caspian Sea, from which it will be carried by tanker to Azerbaijan,
there to enter the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.16 Russian sources say the third
route may ultimately be able to pump up to fifty-six million tons a year of oil.17
Russia, meanwhile, may prioritize oil supplies to the East Siberia–Pacific
pipeline, feeding the port of Kozmino, on the Sea of Japan near Nakhodka; from
there it can be exported to Japan, South Korea, China, the United States, and
other Pacific Basin consumers, not China alone. A spur pipeline from Russia to
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China is now under construction and is scheduled to enter service in the second
half of 2010. Detailed analysis of the project is included later in the study.
Pipelines are more vulnerable to sabotage and military interdiction than
seaborne shipping is. Projects (like the Burma–China pipeline) designed to help
seaborne shipments bypass choke points are expensive, can be blockaded, and
are themselves vulnerable to physical attack by nonstate actors or other parties.
Seaborne shipping, by contrast, is very flexible and can be routed around disruptions. For this reason, pipeline plans predicated on the idea that bypassing
the Strait of Malacca increases oil security are fundamentally flawed. Even if
Malacca were completely sealed off by blockade or accident, tankers could be
diverted through the Sunda, Lombok, or other passages with some disruption
in deliveries and at an additional cost of as little as one or two dollars per barrel.18 Some Chinese analysts now share this conclusion, one noting that “SLOC
[sea line of communication] security is much more important than pipeline
transport lines.”19
Finally, as figure 1 demonstrates, pipelines are far more expensive than tankers
in terms of what must be spent to move a given volume of oil a given distance.20
Certain pipelines—such as the Pakistan, and possibly the Burma, projects—
will likely require substantial subsidies if they are to compete with seaborne
imports. Much of the cost of supporting such uneconomical projects, which are
driven more by politics than profits, will fall on the Chinese government, which
already faces substantial energy-subsidy costs as well as the demands of its fourtrillion-RMB stimulus package.
The first portion of the analysis will examine operational and prospective
pipelines oriented toward China. The projects are arranged chronologically
in the order that they have, will, or might become operational. At present, the
Kazakhstan–China pipeline is operating at partial capacity, a Russia–China line
could become operational by late 2010 (and is likely to be in commercial operation by 2011), the Burma–China pipeline is now under construction, and a
China–Pakistan pipeline remains entirely aspirational.21

FIGURE 1
SAMPLE OIL TRANSPORT COSTS TO CHINA
MODE

ROUTE

DISTANCE (KM)

COST (US$/BBL)

COST (US$/BBL/1000 KM)

Tankera

Ras Tanura–Ningbo

7000

1.25

0.18

Angarsk–Daqing

3200

2.41

0.75

Angarsk–Manzhouli

1000

7.19

7.19

Pipeline

b

Trainc

Notes:
a. VLCC at $150k/day charter, 2 million bpd cargo.
b. Transneft tariff of 15.41 rubles/ton/100 km.
c. Based on weighted average of Russian Railways’ oil tariffs to Zabaikalsk and Naushki.
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The second portion of the study will examine Chinese views of how pipelines
might enhance China’s oil security and assess the potential for, and utility and
disadvantages of, a pipeline-centric oil-security strategy. The final, and concluding, section will suggest how China might enhance its energy security at lower
financial and diplomatic cost.
In the outline that follows of current and possible pipeline projects, fear that
nonstate actors or foreign navies could interdict oil shipments to China will be
prominent as a factor that impels the national government to support overland
supply projects. Yet it should be noted at the outset that national oil companies
may be playing on that fear, the sense of oil insecurity among high-level decision
makers, in order to obtain further state support. Provincial and local officials
are likely doing so to secure projects that could create substantial local investment and job growth.
Indeed, if one averages labor-demand numbers for sample refinery expansion
and newbuild projects in the West and the developing world, a 200,000 bpd refinery, such as that which may be built near Kunming, could create ten thousand
or more construction and engineering jobs while it is being built and at least
several hundred permanent positions to run the plant thereafter.22 Building the
pipeline itself and associated storage and pumping facilities would create additional temporary and permanent jobs.
Understanding the real benefits that pipeline and associated refinery construction would bring local governments makes it imperative to remember in
what follows that local interests and overall Chinese national energy-security
interests must be kept separate. What is beneficial at the local level, or to a certain subset of corporate actors, may not always be the most effective policy for
addressing national strategic concerns. In this sense, significant portions of China’s push for pipelines mirror the “Going Out” oil security strategy, in which the
state oil companies cultivated fears of oil insecurity in Beijing and then turned
around and wrapped themselves in the flag as they sought overseas oil projects.
These projects have boosted their incomes and reserves but have done little to
enhance China’s oil security on the national level; these firms have even damaged China’s image abroad, through their dealings with Sudan and other pariah
states.23
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA PIPELINE
The Kazakhstan–China pipeline is currently China’s only operational overland
oil pipeline project. China previously imported Kazakh crude by rail through
the entry port of Alashankou, in Xinjiang. To move larger volumes and to lower
shipping prices, however, both sides desired a pipeline. In September 1997, the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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Chinese and Kazakh governments signed the General Agreement on the Project of Oil Deposits Development and Pipeline Construction.24 The initial stage
of the line was built from Kenkiyak to Atyrau during 2002–2004, the second
stage during 2004–2006 from Atyrau to the Chinese border at Alashankou.25
The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) funded the construction
cost of $806 million for the thousand-kilometer leg from Atasu to Alashankou,
as well as the cost of a 252 km extension from Alashankou to the refinery at
Dushanzi, also in Xinjiang.26
The pipeline is operated by a joint stock company called MunaiTas NorthWest Pipeline Company CJSC, which is backed by China National Petroleum
Corporation and KazMunaiGaz. Its current capacity is approximately 200,000
bpd. In 2008, however, China imported an average of only 115,000 bpd of crude
oil from Kazakhstan by pipeline and rail.27 In December 2007, the pipeline carried an average of 102,600 bpd—only about half of its total capacity—due to
pricing disputes and problems with supply availability that created gaps, only
partially fi lled with Russian crude from western Siberia. The line has carried
Kazakh Kumkol crude as well as crudes from Russia.28 This situation is due to
the fact that current Kazakh production does not yet completely fi ll the line and
also because lighter, less waxy Russian oils are blended with waxy Kazakh crudes
during the winter to prevent them from solidifying and blocking the line.
Figure 2 shows the current pipeline and future planned additions. Now that
the segment from Kenkiyak to Kumkol is completed, Kazakhstan’s Caspian Sea
production (in the Tengiz and Kashagan fields) can enter a pipeline network
reaching deep into China. In August 2007, CNPC opened a 400,000-bpd-capacity
crude oil pipeline from Shanshan in Xinjiang to the refining center at Lanzhou, in Gansu Province.29 This line, and a parallel oil products pipeline, will
allow crude and refined products from Xinjiang to be shipped to Lanzhou and
then into CNPC’s existing pipeline network serving central and southwestern
China. This will permit Kazakh crude to penetrate deep into China, because
as crude oil and products from the Dushanzi refinery can be shipped farther
east, boosting oil supplies to the inland regions that will be a focus of Beijing’s
development program, regional economic disparities will be reduced. The
Kazakhstan–China pipeline will also be integrated with a new strategic petroleum reserve site under construction near Ürümqi, which will store fifty-one
million barrels of crude once completed.30 The line could reach a maximum
throughput capacity of 400,000 bpd in 2011, if its final stage, from Kenkiyak to
Kumkol, reaches its full capacity by that time.
While this pipeline project originated in part due to oil-supply security concerns, it is easily justifiable as the most economic way to bring Kazakh crude
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FIGURE 2
KAZAKHSTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: EXISTING ROUTE

existing

oil into the western Chinese market. China wins, because it gains what it sees
as “secure” oil supplies; Kazakhstan gains a crude export route independent of
Russia and a new market for its oil; and Russian companies gain an additional
route for getting western Siberian crude oil production into the Chinese market.
A RUSSIA–CHINA PIPELINE
China views Russia as a rich and secure oil source capable of delivering crude
overland, far from U.S. Navy–patrolled sea routes. China and Russia first began
discussing a pipeline in 1994. Yukos unveiled plans in 2001 to construct a pipeline from Angarsk to Daqing. These plans were suspended during the Kremlin’s
2004–2007 assault on Yukos and have been superseded by Transneft’s massive
East Siberia–Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline. The ESPO’s first section, from
Taishet to Skovorodino, is complete and can now pump crude, although as of
September 2009 the line was running in reverse, moving crude into the existing
western Siberian pipeline network. The second half of the line runs 2,100 km
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from Skovorodino to Nakhodka, on the Sea of Japan, and the entire line may
not be fully operational until 2025.31 Figure 3 shows oil pipelines existing, under
construction, and planned from Russia.
In the meantime, China has been importing increasing volumes of crude
from Russia by rail (as well as smaller volumes through the Kazakhstan–China
pipeline). In 2007 and 2008, China imported an average of more than 300,000
bpd of Russian crude.32 Shipping crude by rail can cost twice as much as shipping
it by pipeline, however.33 Driven by this reality and by the fact that regional rail
infrastructure likely cannot handle China’s ultimately desired crude volumes,
CNPC and Sinopec (the primary Chinese buyers of Russian crude) pushed for
construction of a spur pipeline from Skovorodino to Daqing, in Heilongjiang
Province. The entire spur line will run roughly a thousand kilometers (seventy
kilometers on the Russian side and 965 km on the Chinese side) and will cost
around $436 million.34 The Chinese side is financing the majority of the spur’s
length, as it lies largely on Chinese soil. Initial capacity is slated to be fifteen million tons per year (300,000 bpd), with the possibility of later expansion to thirty
million tons annually (600,000 bpd).35
Pricing disputes and a relative lack of profitability restrained Russian pipeline
export plans to China for more than a decade. Until very recently, CNPC and
Rosneft had serious disputes over rail crude-pricing formulas, and it is likely
that similar issues may have affected the pipeline project. This would not be
surprising, as the Kazakhstan–China pipeline has often run at below capacity
FIGURE 3
RUSSIA–CHINA OIL PIPELINES: EXISTING, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, AND PLANNED

under construction

existing
planned
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due to pricing disputes.36 Russian Railways, run by Viktor Yakunin, a Putin acquaintance and former KGB officer, also opposed pipeline construction, which
would erode Russian Railways’ substantial income from hauling oil to China.
The global financial crisis and Russian companies’ need for cash have changed
the landscape, however. In April 2009, Transneft and Rosneft signed an agreement for a $25 billion loan from China Development Bank in exchange for delivering 300,000 bpd of oil to China for the next twenty years and also building a
64 km spur pipeline from Skovorodino to the Chinese border, according to RIA
Novosti. Russia’s powerful railway lobby originally opposed the pipeline plan
but in June 2008 the Russian Railways CEO retracted his prior opposition to the
plan, saying instead that he hopes to ship marginal high-grade crude volumes
of a few million tons per year to China.37 Higher-quality crudes lose value when
blended with lower-quality oils for pipeline shipment.
Russia’s decision to ship oil to China by pipeline was driven in part by economic necessity, as Rosneft and Transneft needed a cash infusion in early 2009.
It was also driven by the imperative of cementing the Sino-Russian energy relationship with a large-scale supply deal. During summer 2008, sources close
to Rosneft indicated that despite the Russian government’s growing desire for a
pipeline to China, the company wanted to stall the spur pipeline for as long as
possible due to the route’s lower profitability relative to other options.38
The immediate economics of crude export from eastern Siberia changed in
July 2009 as the Kremlin ordered a nine-month-long suspension of oil export
duties on production from thirteen key oil fields, including Rosneft’s large new
Vankor field. That said, given Russia’s gaping budget deficit as of December 2009
and resulting hunger for tax revenues, we believe there is a medium probability
that the tax holiday will not be extended for more than twenty-four months,
since it is more politically expedient to raise revenue by ending an oil tax holiday
than by taxing citizens on food, alcohol, and other goods.
While the China–Russia pipeline deal is presently on track, there are still
a number of potential friction points. Rosneft may still worry that near- and
medium-term production from eastern Siberia cannot fi ll the spur line and ensure adequate supplies to the new 400,000 bpd refinery that the company plans
to build near the Pacific port of Nakhodka.
Perhaps of greatest concern to Beijing, Moscow has and will have options to
divert oil from China if it so desires. While the initial capacity of Russia’s line to
China will be 300,000 bpd, and could rise to 600,000 bpd, an alternative pipeline to the Pacific coast (perhaps with initial capacity available within ten years;
and spurred by the potential Rosneft refinery at Nakhodka) could ultimately
offer Moscow oil diversion alternatives that it might possibly use to pressure
China. Russia can also move sufficient volumes of crude oil by rail to the Pacific
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2010
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Ocean to allow it to cut off a substantial portion of pipeline exports to China
in the event of a dispute. Transneft does not operate under the normal economic incentives that U.S. and European pipeline operators do, meaning that
if ordered by the Kremlin, the company will favor achieving political objectives
over the need to keep capacity utilization high to maximize earnings and please
shareholders.
A BURMA–CHINA PIPELINE
The proposed Burma–China oil pipeline aims to reduce China’s reliance on oil
shipped through the Malacca Strait. The idea of the pipeline was first articulated
publicly in 2004 by Yunnan University professor Yang Xiaohui.39 Yang argued
that given Burma and Southeast Asia’s historical collective role as a “backdoor”
supply line for China, a Burma–China line would reduce reliance on Malacca
and help secure Chinese oil imports.40
National and local economic development interests then worked to generate
additional support for the project. The Yunnan provincial government subsequently professed its support for the project, and in early 2006 the Burma–China
pipeline emerged on the national radar screen when the National Development
and Reform Commission’s (NDRC’s) 2005 “Refining Industry Development
Overview” named it one of four key oil import channels.41 Figure 4 shows the
proposed pipeline route and facilities that might be associated with the project.
It appears that CNPC will finance the bulk of the line’s construction costs,
in addition to supporting infrastructure. If the project proceeds, by 2010 CNPC
plans to construct an oil wharf capable of berthing tankers of 300,000 deadweight tonnage, as well as storage facilities capable of holding more than four
million barrels of crude.42 The project will be a key element of China’s plans to
promote inland economic development, as its southwest provinces of Yunnan,
Tibet, Guizhou, and Guangxi, as well as Chongqing Municipality, often have
difficulty receiving stable fuel supplies from the refining centers at Lanzhou and
Guangzhou.43
One proposal includes constructing a 400,000 bpd refinery and a colocated million-ton-per-year ethylene plant near Kunming, Yunnan.44 The government of Chongqing Municipality, with the support of Sinopec, has also proposed extending the line to Chongqing and building refining facilities there.45
The pipeline’s initial capacity is slated to be 200,000 bpd, but if it is expanded
to 300,000 or 400,000 bpd both Kunming and Chongqing could build refineries of significant size. It is currently unclear whether or not the tragic May 2008
Sichuan earthquake might cause national and provincial officials to reconsider
locating a large refinery near an active seismic zone.
The NDRC might prefer constructing refineries near both cities, as it allows
both areas to gain economically and would also permit the central government
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/8
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FIGURE 4
BURMA–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE AND ASSOCIATED FACILITIES

under construction
disputed area

to reward both of the main state-owned refiners, CNPC and Sinopec. Southwest
China is currently a zone of competition between the two, with traditional oil
company “spheres of influence” overlapping increasingly as each company seeks
a greater degree of vertical integration and tries to seize market share.46 For example, CNPC and Sinopec competed vigorously in early 2007 to win approval to
build a 200,000 bpd refinery in Guangxi.47 CNPC emerged victorious, probably
because it can use its flagship Sudan project to guarantee crude oil supplies to
the refinery.
From the economic perspective, a Burma–China pipeline may make sense,
as the costs of piping crude to inland refineries in southwest China and then
distributing refined products through the expanding pipeline network likely approximate those of shipping crude by tanker to southeast China, refining it there,
and then shipping products by pipe or rail to southwest Chinese consumers.
A comparative example of overland pipeline crude competing successfully
with seaborne crude in a continental market is that of Canadian oil imports into
the midwestern United States. Recently, the well developed American pipeline
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network has allowed Canadian crude to penetrate almost to the Gulf Coast, the
epicenter of U.S. seaborne crude imports.48 China’s pipeline network for crude
and products cannot compare with that of the United States at present, but the
NDRC and the state oil companies are working quickly to expand China’s domestic pipeline systems for oil and refined products, so regional markets are
likely to become increasingly integrated over time.
The Burma–China pipeline also provides an impetus for enhancing crude
and product supplies by building additional regional refineries and expanding
the area’s product pipeline networks. Oil product demand, particularly for motor fuels, has been growing strongly in southwestern China in recent years as
the area undergoes rapid economic development and consumer incomes rise.
Historically, the region has been short on refining capacity and a refinery at the
terminus of the pipeline from Burma would help to address this deficiency.49
Expanding regional oil-processing capacity will also create significant employment, through construction work and, later, for manning the facilities. As China
reforms its domestic oil pricing system, having refineries in remote southwest
China might give the owner of those plants a high degree of price-setting power
and the ability to charge a premium for fuel produced.
From the security perspective, however, a Burma–China pipeline largely fails
the test. It would allow around 200,000 bpd of oil imports to bypass the Ma lacca
Strait, yet it would be exposed to major security risks in Burma, which is ruled by
a capricious junta and still struggles with ethnic separatism in regions through
which the pipeline will pass.50 Separatism still smolders in Burma’s hinterlands,
as evidenced by the August 2009 clashes in Burma’s Kokang region that sent at
least thirty thousand refugees streaming into China’s Yunnan Province. Transit
countries hosting pipelines gain significant strategic leverage. This leverage can
manifest itself in calculated strategic moves or in disputes over other factors,
such as pricing and transit payments. For example, Ukraine effectively reduced
European natural-gas supplies in the winter of 2005–2006 by siphoning off gas
to replace supplies to Ukraine that Gazprom had cut and was able thereby to put
Russia in a very difficult position diplomatically. The same dynamic unfolded in
even starker fashion when Gazprom cut off gas supplies to Ukraine in January
2009 and gas supplies actually stopped for several days to a number of Eastern
and Central European consumers of Russian gas.
China would also be seen as directly financing the Burmese junta’s rule and
its repression of the population, since an operational oil line would likely generate direct transit payments of at least fourteen million dollars a year.51 Furthermore, in the event of conflict, the oil port/pipeline terminus at Sittwe on
Burma’s coast would be a concentrated target set, highly vulnerable to blockade
or precision strike.
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol63/iss2/8
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A proposed canal across Thailand’s Kra Isthmus, now stalled, appears unrealistic. Zhang Xuegang, a scholar at the China Institutes of Contemporary
International Relations, maintains optimistically that it “could . . . provide a
strategic seaway to the Chinese navy” through which “fleets could . . . more
easily protect the nearby sea-lanes and gain access to the Indian Ocean.”52 But
a canal across the isthmus could cost twenty billion dollars or more to build
and, like the Burma–China pipeline, would simply concentrate the target set for
potential blockaders.
A PAKISTAN–CHINA PIPELINE?
Some Pakistani and Chinese analysts have also suggested the possibility of
building an “energy corridor,” including oil pipelines, from Pakistan into western China to diversify China’s oil import routes and avoid the Malacca Strait.53
Yet other Chinese analysts increasingly recognize that geographic and security
barriers render a Pakistan–China oil pipeline unfeasible in the near and medium terms.54
These Chinese analysts express grave reservations about the security situation in Pakistan in light of the country’s perpetual violence and increasing political instability, along with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist
attacks against outsiders. Indeed, Chinese workers have been kidnapped and
killed in at least three separate incidents in western and northwestern Pakistan,
the regions that would be traversed by a Pakistan–China pipeline.55 The pipeline
would also transit a part of Kashmir that, while controlled by Pakistan, is also
claimed by India. Figure 5 shows the currently proposed route of a Pakistan–
China oil pipeline. In addition to security problems, there would also be serious
financial barriers, since oil transport costs could run to at least ten dollars a barrel to achieve payout plus a 10 percent rate of return.
Even at a price above a hundred dollars a barrel, a transport cost of nine
to ten dollars a barrel is very high compared to that of seaborne shipping. If a
Chinese oil company chose to move 200,000 bpd of crude through the Burma–
China pipeline and 250,000 bpd through the Pakistan–China line, it could lose
roughly a billion dollars a year compared to what it would have paid to move the
oil by sea to eastern China.* Beijing would likely have to subsidize such operations, either directly or indirectly. A billion dollars is roughly 6.8 billion RMB at
today’s exchange rates and exceeds by 30 percent the Chinese government’s total
of 4.9 billion RMB in subsidy payments to refiners in 2007.
If the Chinese government allowed fuel to be sold at market prices, companies might have a much higher incentive to build pipelines into remote areas
* This assumes a transport cost difference between pipeline and sea transport of $3/bbl for oil moving
through the Burma–China line and $7/bbl for oil moving through the Pakistan–China line.
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FIGURE 5
PAKISTAN–CHINA OIL PIPELINE: PROPOSED ROUTE

Line of Actual Control
Line of Control
speculative
disputed area

like western and southwestern China; regional fuel deficits could allow them
to charge premium rates for fuels produced by refineries at the end of the pipeline. Under these conditions, pipeline plans might be more financially attractive
than they are now, with Chinese oil product prices lagging international market
prices by 15–20 percent during times of high crude oil prices, such as those of
midsummer 2008.
Geography and cost alone would pose major challenges, however, even under
the best of conditions. The pipeline would have to be constructed in some of
the world’s most challenging terrain. Moreover, it would need to lift oil from
sea level at Gwadar up to the 15,400-foot-high Khunjerab Pass, requiring massive pumping power and steady electrical supplies in remote areas vulnerable
to insurgent activity. By way of comparison, the Trans-Alaska and Baku–Tbilisi–
Ceyhan pipelines climb from sea level to apogees of 2,800 feet and 9,000 feet,
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respectively, before returning to sea level.56 The Trans-Ecuadorian Pipeline
(TEP) climbs from a thousand feet above sea level to 13,300 feet above sea level in the relatively short distance of 125 miles, making some cite the TEP as
an example of the “technical feasibility” of a pipeline from Pakistan to China.
However, further analysis causes that comparison to fall short, because at 310
miles the TEP is only about one-fifth the length of the proposed pipeline from
Pakistan to China and does not cross territory rife with insurgent activity and
general instability.
Despite the major challenges, there is still considerable discussion from a variety of Pakistani and Indian sources regarding the latent strategic value of the
new port at Gwadar, in western Pakistan along the Arabian Sea, a likely starting point for any Pakistan–China oil pipeline. For all of the hype about the
development of Gwadar as a facility to support Chinese naval operations in the
Indian Ocean, however, there is in fact very little hard evidence to suggest this
is the case, and the contract for the management of the port was awarded to the
Port Authority of Singapore. In fact, barring a major shift by the Chinese side, it
appears that the main impetus for establishing an “energy corridor” is coming
from the Pakistani side.57 President Pervez Musharraf pushed the idea in June
2006 and apparently raised the issue again during talks with President Hu Jintao
during the April 2008 Bo’ao Forum, but with no apparent results to date.58
DOWNSIDES
The enthusiasm with which some Chinese analysts contemplate these pipeline
projects is based, as we have seen, on a conviction that they will reduce China’s
reliance on seaborne oil imports, which, they fear, may be easily interdicted in
time of crisis. Too many of the (relatively few) analyses of these issues produced
thus far have, however, failed to consider the physical and economic realities of
oil transshipment, which greatly complicate seaborne oil blockade operations.
High Transport and Construction Costs
Importing oil into southwest China through a Burma–China pipeline rather
than through an expanded pipe network serving existing oil ports at Maoming
and elsewhere in South China will be very costly. Pipelines are expensive to construct in frontier regions like Burma, and new deepwater oil-import jetties and
associated storage facilities will have to be built at the pipeline start point on the
Burmese coast. Pipeline shipping will also be very expensive relative to maritime shipping, as pumping oil through the planned Burmese line could cost
more than four dollars a barrel, assuming that CNPC seeks at least a 10 percent
internal rate of return in operating the line.59
In contrast, shipping oil by sea from the Persian Gulf to South China can
cost as little as US$1.00 per barrel for transport costs, and piping it to interior
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refineries in areas likely to be served by the Burma–China line would cost an
additional two or three dollars a barrel.* This represents a substantial cost savings over moving crude through the proposed Burma–China line to refineries
in Yunnan. To lower “stated” project costs, the NDRC might subsidize project
financing or take other measures to reward CNPC, any of which would cost the
Chinese government more than if it relied on seaborne imports to South China
for supplying pipelines to the interior.
At newbuild prices for very large crude carriers (VLCCs), roughly $140 million per vessel, one could build fourteen ships for the two-billion-dollar estimated price of the Burma–China pipeline. Given that each VLCC carries roughly
two million barrels of crude and that the round-trip from the Persian Gulf to
southeast China takes thirty total days, fourteen additional supertankers could
deliver an average of 666,000 bpd of crude, versus 200,000 bpd for the planned
pipeline. The cost disparity between maritime and pipeline shipping would be
even greater for the Pakistan–China line, through which it could cost up to 10
dollars to move a barrel of oil to Ürümqi in western China.60 After reaching
Ürümqi, the oil would have to be piped an additional three or four thousand
kilometers to reach major east coast demand centers, meaning that transport
costs from the Persian Gulf to Chinese end users could exceed fifteen dollars a
barrel, as opposed to closer to US$2.00/barrel (bbl) for oil transported from the
Gulf to eastern China on supertankers as of March 2009 (the peak equivalent
approached $4–$5/bbl in July 2008; during this time, however, pipeline operators raised rates as well).61
Growing Demand in Pipeline Terminus Region
Driven by earthquake reconstruction in Sichuan, the rapid development of
Chongqing, and other regional growth, oil product demand in interior southwest
China is on the upswing and will continue to grow strongly as the government
promotes further growth of domestic consumption. Chongqing’s mayor says the
city, which is analogous to “China’s Chicago” for its position as a linchpin inland
economic powerhouse, will see 14.5 percent year-on-year gross domestic product growth in 2009.62 Building more local refining capacity and expanding the
domestic pipeline system into underserved areas would be a more secure and
lower-cost way of ensuring oil and product supplies while still creating jobs.
Physical Security Risks
Pipelines face substantial physical security risks. In fact, with the Burma and
Pakistan pipelines, there would be a twofold vulnerability. First, oil would have
* Based on costs of moving oil and refined products from the sea to and from inland Russian refineries,
which are at a distance from seaports similar to that at which plants at the terminus of the Burma–China
line would be.
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to be brought by sea to the pipeline terminus via long sea-lanes, concentrating
the target set for an enemy force.63 Then, it would have to be pumped through a
long line traversing remote terrain in potentially insecure areas.64
Pipelines are typically more vulnerable to sustained disruptions than are
ships. Tankers at sea can be rerouted, while pipelines are fi xed links between a
producer and consumer. Terrorists and insurgents have mounted only a handful
of successful attacks on oil tankers (for example, Limburg, off Yemen in 2002;
and Sirius Star, off Kenya in November 2008). However, nonstate actors in Colombia, Nigeria, Iraq, and other countries have been able to disrupt oil pipeline
operations on a consistent basis despite preventative efforts by local security
forces. As for China, CNPC reports that from 2002 to 2006, thieves “have illegally drilled into” its pipelines “18,382 times . . . causing the company a loss of
more than 500 million RMB ($72 million).”65
Pipelines offer a wealth of targeting options to nonstate actors and opposing
militaries.66 Destroying or damaging the pipeline itself is relatively simple; an attacker simply needs to know where the line is, dig down to it if necessary (some,
though not all, pipelines are buried), and use explosives to rupture it.67 Such
attacks typically cause only brief disruptions, as spare line is relatively cheap
and simple to stock, and repairs can usually be carried out quickly—although
repair crews would have more trouble working in remote areas, whose populations in Burma or Pakistan might be armed and hostile. More critical pipeline
vulnerabilities include pump stations, storage facilities, pipeline termini, and
the power supplies that run pumps and other key equipment.68 On one hand,
most of these facilities would be more difficult for nonstate groups to target
successfully, because government forces could concentrate their resources on
protecting such discrete facilities, as opposed to several thousand kilometers of
pipe. On the other hand, electrical power generators, transmission towers, and
buried cables can be attacked as readily as pipelines. Disrupting power supplies
would reduce throughput in the best case and could halt it completely if attacks
became sufficiently severe (e.g., were conducted simultaneously at different
points). According to Li Wei, director of the center for counterterrorism studies
at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, “Though terrorists are more likely to aim at causing a large number of casualties instead of
attacking pipelines in China, there is still the possibility.”69
During an interstate conflict, however, the dynamics would be quite different.
Modern military forces equipped with precision-guided munitions could target
pumping stations and other vital points, many of which run through remote
areas with low populations, and rapidly disable pipelines carrying oil or gas into
China. A maritime blockade, on the other hand, would be extremely difficult
to conduct effectively. Oil cargoes in normal commerce may change ownership
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ten or more times while a ship is at sea, which reduces the effectiveness of a
distant blockade since it is challenging to identify a cargo’s final destination.70
Moreover, if implementing a close blockade of the Chinese coast would solve
the destination-identification problem, it would also bring the blockader’s forces
within range of numerous and capable Chinese access-denial systems, including
ballistic and cruise missiles, naval mines, and submarines.71 In short, the flexibility of modern maritime oil transport confers far greater oil-supply security
benefits than would pipelines supplied by sea or traversing unstable regions.
A BAROMETER OF CHINESE TRUST IN MARKETS
Absent discovery of an economically viable large-scale substitute for crude oil,
pipeline development will likely be insufficient to offset China’s rising seaborne
oil import demand. A simple comparison of planned oil pipeline supply additions to China’s likely overall demand growth in coming years bears this out, as
demand growth will very likely outstrip overland supply additions under even
the most optimistic scenarios.
Some projects (e.g., the Burma line) make sense from local and corporate
perspectives but not that of national oil security. The Burma line will be expensive to build. The numbers can be “massaged” to ensure that officially tabulated project costs remain near the stated figure of two billion dollars, but the
real costs could be much higher. Also, given Burma’s high political risk and
the fact that placing a pipeline terminus along the poorly defensible Burmese
coast might invite interdiction during wartime, relying on shipments through
the Burma line would not enhance China’s oil security. This increases transport
cost and concentrates the target set for an adversary during a conflict but does
not provide the same supply security gains that a pipeline from Kazakhstan or
Russia can deliver.
A more secure approach might entail building a more comprehensive pipe grid
connecting southern Chinese oil ports in Guangdong to the interior southwest
provinces. Construction costs would likely be similar (possibly lower, without
the political and security risks inherent in Burma). In addition, the immediate
and long-term economic benefits could be high, since enhancing China’s internal oil and products transportation grid would boost and stabilize fuel supplies
to Guangxi and other relatively impoverished inland provinces in which Beijing
hopes to catalyze development.
Other lines are simply unviable from nearly all perspectives. The very idea of
a Pakistan line, with its formidable geography, its regional instability, and the
absence of a major demand center at the terminus, exemplifies this chimera.
That is not to say that there is no logical role for pipelines in China’s oil import
portfolio. Some pipeline projects are driven by geographic reality (e.g., the line
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already delivering oil from Kazakhstan and the line under construction from
Russia). The fields fi lling these lines are so far from the sea that an overland line
is the most effective way to transport their oil into the Chinese market. Pipelines
move oil much more cheaply than rail can. But, as happened in the early years
of China’s “Going Out” strategy, special interests also appear to be playing the
security card to benefit themselves in the face of more rational, comprehensive
calculations of national interest.
At the strategic level, a productive area for future research concerns the naval implications of Eurasian energy access, taken more broadly. This could be
investigated by methodologies similar to those employed in this study to assess
the relative dependence of China and India (as consumers) and Russia (as a
supplier) on seaborne energy flows between now and 2025. It might be expected
that Russia’s preponderance of overland energy transport routes will tend to
reinforce that nation’s traditional continental orientation, whereas increasing
reliance on seaborne energy imports in China and India will further the bluewater naval development cited in the Global Trends 2025 report.72
A continued quest for higher overland oil deliveries will not enhance China’s
oil supply security substantially but will rather be a barometer of Chinese trust
in global oil markets and maritime oil transport security. As this article has
demonstrated, however, Chinese decision makers will ultimately have to face
the fact that their nation’s dependence on seaborne oil imports is likely only to
increase. This reality and China’s other growing overseas interests have already
stimulated debate concerning the extent to which China should develop a bluewater navy to defend its commerce on the high seas.
Before Beijing commits firmly to such a substantial investment, which is likely
to have tremendous geopolitical ramifications—some of them likely to involve
counterbalancing by regional nations discomfited by such ambitious Chinese
naval growth—it would be wise to see if China and the United States can come
to a better understanding of their respective roles in the Asia-Pacific as well as
work to clarify areas ripe for mutually beneficial energy security cooperation.
Such strategic dialogue would be difficult to pursue, and it would not in itself
resolve the substantial differences in national interests. But the economic interdependence between the two nations and the potential costs of miscommunication are so high that repeated efforts must be made.
This is a critical time in China’s naval development, and the events of the next
few years will have disproportionate influence. As a Chinese analyst at a highlevel government institution told one of the authors recently, China’s naval development will hinge on “China’s understanding of the international system. If
China feels that it is possible to rely on the international oil market, at least some
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in China believe that a larger navy is unnecessary.” A good first step would be to
encourage Beijing to join two related international organizations. Washington
should take the lead in trying to bring Beijing into the International Renewable
Energy Agency (IRENA); as well as the International Energy Agency (IEA), as
it meets the requirement to store 90 days of import reserves, so that strategic
petroleum reserve inventories can be tracked and reported.
Even these modest measures may require time. The Chinese government is
unlikely to immediately initiate a detailed oil inventory reporting system. Recent steps—such as the decision in late 2009 to stop publishing PetroChina and
Sinopec’s refined products inventories—are worrisome. The growing acrimony
over proposed carbon emission restrictions in the wake of the disappointing
December 2009 Copenhagen climate meetings also does not bode well for quick
progress on diplomatic initiatives seeking Chinese oil inventory transparency in
the next one to two years.
Despite these ongoing challenges, there remains room for optimism. The October 2007 issuance of a new maritime strategy by the U.S. sea services suggests
that Washington is eager to support cooperative, collective approaches to maritime energy security. Discussion among China, the United States, and other key
energy market stakeholders may facilitate adoption of energy security measures
far more effective and mutually beneficial than expensive, limited-capacity, and
vulnerable pipelines.
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